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I. Introduction
This Note considers the sentencing of two imaginary defendants, Jeff
Smith and Patty Brown, to illustrate the developing circuit split on the issue
of grouping fraud and money laundering counts. Prior to their arrest, both
individuals were misguided entrepreneurs who were using a get-rich-quick
scheme devised by a mutual friend. Although the get-rich-quick scheme
* This Note would not have been possible without the guidance of Professor Pamela
Metzger and the careful proofreading and advice of my dedicated editors. Thanks also to Rich
Smith for his role in selecting this topic. Most of all, I wish to thank my wife, Elizabeth, for her
unswerving support over the past three years.
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promised a large return, it required a healthy amount of deceitful marketing
and mail fraud to separate the potential investors from their hard earned cash.
The scheme involved placing advertisements in newspapers that promised
investors a large return for a $10,000 investment in a growing internet com-
pany. In reality, there was no investment; it was merely a ponzi scheme.'
Despite the criminal nature of the scheme, Smith and Brown decided to take
their chances and participate. Smith went to New York to implement his
scheme. Brown started her scheme in Virginia.
Although both Smith and Brown found many willing investors, their
individual successes were short-lived. Police arrested the defendants, but only
after each had defrauded fifty victims of $10,000 a piece. Federal district
courts in differentjurisdictions convicted Smith and Brown for their respective
fraudulent schemes under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.2 Additionally, the courts con-
victed the defendants of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B).'
At sentencing, both courts calculated the amount of money fraudulently ob-
tained and the amount of money laundered as $500,000.
Though their circumstances were identical, there was one critical differ-
ence - the location of their sentencing. The Federal District Court in Albany,
New York sentenced defendant Smith; the Federal District Court in Rich-
mond, Virginia sentenced defendant Brown. Because Smith and Brown were
convicted and sentenced in different locations, they received different sen-
tences for committing identical crimes.
Initially, Smith's and Brown's sentencing calculations looked identical,
and both courts used the same initial guidelines calculations. First the courts
determined the offense level for the mail fraud count under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2Fl (USSG § 2Fl or § 2Fl.1).4 The base offense
1. A ponzi or pyramid scheme is a fraudulent investment scheme in which no real invest-
ment exists. See WEBSTEW'S Nwir- NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 914 (Frederick C. Mish et
al. eds. 1987) (defining ponzi scheme as "an investment swindle in which some early investors
are paid off with money put up by later ones in order to encourage more and bigger risks"). The
individual who runs such a scheme uses the cash from new investors to pay "dividends" to
previous investors, thus creating the illusion of a profitable investment. See United States v.
Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1995) ("As with the typical ponzi scheme, [the defen-
dant] used some of the contributions from later investors to pay off returns promised to earlier
investors, thus perpetuating the scheme by leading investors to believe [the investment] was...
successful, profitable enterprise."). At the same time, the individual who runs the scheme takes
cash out ofthe scheme for personal use. See id. ("[The defendant] spent some ofthe fraudulently
acquired money on symbols of success, such as an airplane, fictional glossy brochures, staffed
offices, and a country club membership."). When new investors become scarce, the scheme
collapses, and the investors lose their money.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1999).
3. Id. § 1956(aXl)(B).
4. U.S. SENTENCDwG GUIDEUNES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (1999) [hereinafter USSG] (stating
that § 2F11.1 applies to counts of fraud).
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level was 6. The specific offense characteristic of $500,000 increased the
offense level by 10 to 16.6 Because both Smith's and Brown's schemes in-
volved multiple victims and mass marketing, § 2Fl.1(b)(2)-(3) increased the
offense level by 4.' The resulting final offense level for the mail fraud count
was 20.
Similarly, the courts determined that the base offense level for the money
laundering acts was 20 under § 2S1.1. The specific offense characteristic of
$500,000 increased the offense level by 3.9 The resulting final offense level
for the money laundering count was 23.
At this point, the courts looked to the grouping rules of § 3D to determine
the final combined offense level of the counts.' First, the courts turned to
§ 3D 1.1, which sets out the procedures to follow when a court has convicted
a defendant of more than one criminal count.1 The courts grouped closely
related counts by applying § 3D1.2.12 The courts then determined the offense
level applicable to each Group by applying § 3D1.3.13 Finally, the courts
turned to § 3D1.4 to compute the final combined offense level.'
4 The final
combined offense level, along with the defendant's criminal history category,
determines the guideline sentencing range." At this critical juncture, the two
courts proceeded differently.
In Smith's case, the district court in New York followed Second Circuit
precedent 6 and sentenced Smith accordingly. Second Circuit courts do not
5. See id. § 2Fl.1(a) (setting base offense level at 6).
6. See id. § 2FI.I(bXl) (stating increases in offense level corresponding to amount of
monetary loss).
7. See id. §§ 2Fl.l(bX2)-(3) (providing two-level increase for scheme to defraud more
than one victim and two-level increase for use of mass-marketing).
8. See id. § 2Sl.l(aX2) (setting base offense level at20).
9. See id. § 2SI.I(bX2) (stating increases in offense level corresponding to specific
offense characteristic of amount of monetary loss).
10. See id. §§ 3D1.1-1.4 (providing rules for grouping and calculating total combined
offense level for multiple counts).
11. See id. § 3Dl1 (stating procedure for determining final combined offense level for
conviction on multiple counts).
12. See id. § 3D1.2 (stating that "counts involving substantially the same harm shall be
grouped together into a single Group").
13. See id. § 3D1.3 (stating procedure to determine offense level for Group of closely
related counts).
14. See id. § 3D1A (stating procedure to determine final combined offense level).
15. See id. § 5A (providing sentencing table).
16. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that grouping
of fraud and money laundering counts is inappropriate). For a detailed examination of Napoli,
see infra Part HA.
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group together fraud counts and money laundering counts,17 but instead con-
sider the mail fraud count and the money laundering count as two distinct
Groups.'" Consequently, the court that sentenced Smith applied § 3D1.4 to
determine the combined offense level of the two Groups. 9 The court first
counted as one unit the Group with the higher offense level, the money
laundering Group.20 The court then counted the fraud Group as one additional
unit because the fraud Group was three levels less serious than the money
laundering Group. 21 The one additional unit increased the offense level of the
more serious Group by two levels, resulting in a final combined offense level
of 25.22 For a first time offender, the corresponding sentencing range was
fifty-seven to seventy-one months. 3
However, the calculation for Brown in Virginia proceeded in a fundamen-
tally different fashion. In the Fourth Circuit, courts group fraud counts and
money laundering counts into a single Group under § 3D 1.2(d).24 The court
determined the offense level of the single Group by applying § 3D1.3(b).'
Thus, the offense level of the Group was the offense level of the most serious
count in the Group.26 Because the money laundering count carries the highest
17. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 13 (stating that grouping of fraud and money laundering
counts under USSG § 3D1.3(d) is incorrect as matter of law).
18. See USSG § 3Dl.1 (1999) (stating that courts shall group counts into distinct Groups
of closely related counts); id. § 3D1.2(d) (requiring grouping of certain counts to which same
guideline applies).
19. See id. § 3D1.4 (stating procedure for determining final combined offense level).
20. See id. § 3D1 .4(a) (stating that Group with highest offense level counts as one unit).
21. See id. (stating that each Group from 1 to 4 levels less serious counts as one additional
unit).
22. See id. § 3D1 .4 (stating that two units results in increasing offense level of most
serious Group by 2 levels).
23. See id. § SA (providing sentencing table).
24. See id. § 3D1.2(d) (stating that counts shall be grouped "[wlhen the offense level is
determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss"). Fourth Circuit courts
group fraud and money laundering counts when both offenses were part of a common scheme.
See United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that fraud and money
laundering are properly grouped under § 3D1.2(d) because money laundering was part of
common fraudulent scheme).
25. See USSG § 3D1.3(b) (1999) ("In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to
§ 3D1.2(d), the offense level applicable to a Group is the offense level corresponding to the
aggregated quantity.").
26. Id. Because Brown laundered the same $500,000 that he obtained fraudulently, the
aggregated quantity is $500,000. See United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 166 (4th Cir.
1997) (concluding that aggregated quantity is total amount of money involved in scheme);
United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that aggregated
quantity is total amount offunds involved in scheme); cf. USSO § 3D1.5, illus. 2 (1999) (stating
that total value of checks is aggregate harm under § 3D1.3(b) for offenses grouped pursuant to
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offense level in the Group, the court determined that the total offense level for
the single Group was 23. For Brown, a first time offender, the resulting sen-
tence was forty-six to fifty-seven months.'
At first blush, the result that follows from the sentencing courts' different
grouping decisions seems rather insignificant. The difference in the final
offense level is only 2 levels." However, the two-level difference results in
a sentencing disparity of up to fourteen months.29 Thus, Smith faces a sen-
tence that is potentially more than a full year longer than Brown, even though
the two defendants committed identical offenses. °
As the preceding hypothetical illustrates, something is disturbingly wrong
with a sentencing system that produces such a result. However, the purpose of
this Note is not to declare that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing
Guidelines or Guidelines) are somehow fatally flawed. The purpose of this
Note is twofold. First, this Note illustrates why the United States Sentencing
Commission (Sentencing Commission) and Congress ought to address the
circuit split involving the grouping of fraud and money laundering counts.3
Second, this Note reconciles the views of the courts of appeals and proposes
a solutionthat comports withthe stated purposes and underlying policies ofthe
Sentencing Guidelines.32 This Note proposes a solution that eliminates the
grouping decision from fraud and money laundering cases, yet still provides
incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct.
33
§ 3DI.2(d)). But see United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that if
defendant obtained S1.6 million by fraud and laundered $1.3 million of this money, aggregate
harm is $2.9 million); United States v. O'Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that
defendant who obtained $304,667 by fraud and launders only $73,562 "would be punished for
laundering the total sum of $378,229.50").
27. See USSG § 5A (1999) (providing sentencing table).
28. Compare supra note 22 and accompanying text (stating that final offense level in
Second Circuit is 25), with supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (stating that final offense
level in Fourth Circuit is 23).
29. Compare supra note 23 and accompanying text (stating that sentencing range is fifty-
seven to seventy-one months), with supra note 27 and accompanying text (stating that sentenc-
ing range is forty-six to fifty-seven months).
30. At this juncture, it is interesting to note that if the prosecution had sought only the
fraud counts and had not charged the defendants with money laundering, the resulting sentences
would be thirty-three to forty-one months, an even lesser sentence. See USSG § 5A (1999)
(providing sentencing table).
31. See infra note 227 and accompanying text (stating that solution is necessary to cure
problem of sentencing disparity when money laundering is charged in addition to fraud offense).
32. See infra notes 227-43 and accompanying text (providing solution to grouping issue).
33. See USSG ch.3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (1999) ("The rules in this Part seek to pro-
vide incremental punishment or significant additional criminal conduct."); infra Part VA
(proposing solution to question of whether to group fraud and money laundering counts).
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Part II of this Note explores the reasoning of the competing United States
Courts of Appeals (circuits) that has led to the current split. 34 Part II analyzes
in some detail one principal case from each of the competing circuits.3s Part
I of this Note discusses the impact of the decision to charge money launder-
ing in addition to fraud and concludes that the solution to the grouping split
must also address the problems caused by structure of the money laundering
guideline. 3  Part IV partially reconciles the differences of the competing
circuits by analyzing the competing policy interests announced by the Courts
of Appeals and comparing these policies with the policies that underpin the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines." Part V proposes a solution that alters the
money laundering guideline so that money laundering's base offense level is
that of the underlying offense.3" The solution eliminates the circuit split and
furthers the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines.39 Part V also analyzes the
effects of the proposed solution on the hypothetical defendants. 40 Part VI of
this Note argues that Congress should take action to reform the money laun-
dering guideline, thus resolving the circuit split.4'
I. Exploring the Reasoning of the Circuit Courts
A. Circuits that Do Not Group Fraud and Money Laundering
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Napoli 42 is illustrative
of the reasoning of the circuits that do not group fraud and money laundering
counts.43 The Napoli court made several key points that are common among
34. See infra Part II (exploring reasoning of circuits that group and circuits that do not
group).
35. See infra Part If (analyzing case from each of competing circuits).
36. See infra Part III (discussing impact of decision to charge money laundering in addi-
tion to fraud).
37. See infra Part IV (analyzing competing policy interests of courts of appeals and of
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
38. See infra Part V.A (proposing solution).
39. See infra Part VA (proposing solution).
40. See infra Part V (analyzing effects of solution on hypothetical defendants).
41. See infra Part VI (stating conclusion).
42. 179 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1999).
43. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that district court
was correct to "calculate Napoli's sentence on the basis of separate groups for his fraud and
money laundering counts"). In Napoli, the Second Circuit considered whether to group fraud
and money laundering counts. Id. at 6-13. First, the court decided that grouping under USSO
§ 3D1.2(b) was inappropriate because fraud and money laundering harm different victims. Id.
at 7-8. Next, the court rejected grouping under USSO § 3D1.2(d). Id. at 8-13. The court
reasoned that fraud and money laundering counts are not of the same general type because the
offense level for fraud is based primarily on the amount of money involved, while the offense
level for money laundering is based primarily on the base offense level. Id. at 10-11. Further-
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the nongrouping circuits." First, the Napoli court concluded that fraud and
money laundering harm different victims.4 Second, the court found that the
total offense level for fraud is based primarily on the total amount of money
involved, while the total offense level for money laundering is based primarily
on the base offense level. 6 Third, the court decided that fraud and money
laundering counts are not of the same general type because they "translate
more, the court reasoned that the fraud and money laundering guidelines translate the money
involved in the particular offense "into specific offense level increases at different rates, and at
different monetary division points." Id. at 11-12. Finally, the court asserted that "grouping fraud
and money laundering counts would produce an anomalous result" in certain cases. Id. at 12.
In cases in which the defendant launders only a small portion of the fraudulent proceeds,
grouping would make the total combined offense level higher than if the counts were not
grouped. Id. Consequently, the Napoli court held that the fraud and money laundering counts
"should not be grouped together under subsection (d)." Id. at 13.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that grouping is inappropriate under § 3D1.2(d) because fraud and money laundering measure
harm differently); United States v. O'Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that
grouping under § 3D1.2(d) is not appropriate because money laundering has eleven-point higher
base offense level than fraud); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 1998)
(stating that fraud and money laundering counts are not closely related); United States v.
Kneeland, 148 F3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1998) ('Without making any determination as to whether
there are situations in which the offense level for money laundering might be based on the total
loss, we are persuaded in this case at least, the offense level for money laundering... does not
fall within the purview of subsection (d)."); United States v. Calozza, 125 F.3d 687, 694 (9th
Cir. 1997) (Brewster, J., dissenting) ("Because these two count groups do not involve substan-
tially the same harm, they are treated as separate count groups."); United States v. Kunzman,
54 F.3d 1522, 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding grouping of fraud and money laundering counts
improper under § 3D1.2(b) or § 3D1.2(d) because of difference "in the nature and measure of
harm resulting from these offenses" and because fraud and money laundering have different
victims); United States v. Lombardi, 5 F3d 568, 570 (1st Cir. 1993) (refusing to group under
§ 3D1.2(b) because "the victim of fraud is the insurance company and the victim of money
laundering is society"); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992) (conclud-
ing that fraud and money laundering should not be grouped because measurement of harm for
fraud is fundamentally different than measurement of harm for money laundering). The Eighth
Circuit concisely stated its reasoning as follows:
While both measures address the relative scope of the illegal activity, they do not
measure the same type of harm. And because the base offense level for money
laundering are much higher than the base offense level for fraud .... it is wrong to
assume that the Sentencing Commission intended to equate the amount of fraud
loss with the value of money laundered for every fraudulent scheme that includes
some form of money laundering. [F]raud and money laundering counts are not so
closely related as to permit loss and value grouping under § 3D1.2(d).
Hildebrand, 152 F.3d at 763.
45. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 6 ("Napoli's fraud and money laundering counts involved dif-
ferent harm to different victims.").
46. See id. ("[A]lthough fraud and money laundering both measure their respective harms
in part on the amount of money,.., only the offense level for fraud is based 'primarily' on these
quantities.").
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monetary values into specific offense level increases at different rates."'47
Fourth, the court asserted that grouping fraud and money laundering counts
produces anomalous results in certain cases."
Napoli's conviction arose out of a scheme to defraud buyers of cigarettes
on the black market. 9 Napoli requested large advance payments from over-
seas buyers of cigarettes. ° However, Napoli had no cigarettes and cashed the
buyer's checks without any intention of delivering the cigarettes."1 Napoli
laundered the money by depositing the checks at a casino and, after gamb-
ling, pocketed the remaining cash. 2 The court convicted Napoli of twenty-
one counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) 3
and nine counts of fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343," 4 among other
crimes.
55
As an initial matter, theNapoli courtrejected grouping under § 3D 1.2(b). 6
he court reasoned that it could not group fraud and money laundering counts
because fraud and money laundering harm different victims and § 3D1.2(b)
allows for grouping only when the counts involve the same victim. 7 The
victim of fraud is the person who loses money or property as a result of the
fraud.5 8 However, the victim of money laundering is society in general because
money laundering allows criminals to conceal the source of funds from the
47. Id. at 11-12.
48. USSG § 3D1.2 (1999) (stating that "counts... shall be grouped together into a single
Group... [w]hen counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions con-
nected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan"); see
also United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[G]rouping fraud and money
laundering counts would produce an anomalous result in an important class of cases.").
49. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 4 (stating that Napoli's scheme was to defraud buyers of
cigarettes).
50. See id. (stating that Napoli lured buyers into making large deposits).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1998).
54. Id. § 1343.
55. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 3 (stating that Napoli was convicted of twenty-one counts of
money laundering and nine counts of wire fraud, among other crimes).
56. See id. at 7 (stating that court should not have grouped Napoli's fraud and money
laundering counts).
57. See id. (stating that § 3D1 .2(b) allows for grouping only when counts have same vic-
tim); see also USSG § 3D1.2 (1999) ("Counts involve substantially the same harm within the
meaning of this rule: . .. [w]hen counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common
scheme or plan.").
58. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 7 (stating that victims of fraud are those who have lost prop-
erty as result of fraud).
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authorities.59 By concluding that fraud and money laundering counts involve
different victims, the court decided that grouping under § 3D1.2(b) is never
appropriate.'c
Second, the court addressed the possibility of grouping fraud and money
laundering under § 3D1.2(d).' Section 3D1.2(d) states as follows:
When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total
amount of harm or loss, the quantity ofa substance involved, or some other
measure of aggregate harm, or ifthe offense behavior is ongoing or contin-
uous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behav-
ior.
61
Although at least one circuit has concluded that § 3D1.2(d), like
§ 3D1.2(b), requires harm to the same victim,63 the Napoli court rejected this
conclusion by relying on both the plain language of § 3D1.2(d) and the back-
ground commentary to § 3D 1.2. The Napoli court looked at the language of
§ 3D1.2(d) and found that, unlike § 3D1.2(a) and § 3D1.2(b), § 3D1.2(d) does
not have a same victim requirement.65 Furthermore, the background commen-
tary to § 3D1.2 provides that "[c]ounts involving different victims... are
grouped together only as provided in subsection (c) or (d)."
66
The Napoli court stated that grouping under § 3D1.2(d) "presents a more
difficult question,"67 but it ultimately decided that grouping fraud and money
laundering counts under § 3D1.2(d) is also improper.' The court found
grouping under § 3D1.2(d) to be a difficult question because both fraud and
money laundering measure harm in monetary terms.69 The court, however,
59. See id. at 7-8 ("The victim of money laundering is, by contrast, ordinarily society at
large.').
60. See id. at 8 ("Because we find that Napoli's fraud and money laundering counts
involved different harm to different victims, they cannot be grouped under subsection (b).").
61. Id.
62. USSG § 3D12(d) (1999).
63. See United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
because fraud and money laundering harm different victims and because harm is of different
character, grouping under § 3D1.2(d) is inappropriate).
64. See USSG § 3D1.2, cmt. background (1999) ("Counts involving different victims...
are grouped together only as provided in subsection (c) or (d)."); United States v. Napoli, 179
F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999) ("It would be wrong to project a same-victim requirement into
3D1.2(d).").
65. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 9 (stating that subsection (d) has no same victim requirement).
66. USSG § 3DI.2, cmt. background (1999).
67. United States v. Napol, 179 F.3d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 13.
69. See id. at 9 ("[B]oth fraud and money laundering measure some part of their respec-
tive harms in terms of monetary values.").
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seized upon Application Note 6 to § 3D1.270 which states that "[c]ounts
involving offenses to which different offense guidelines apply are grouped
under subsection (d) if the offenses are of the same general type."71 To
determine if the fraud and money laundering counts are of the same general
type, the court first looked at what fhctor is most determinative of the total
offense level of the fraud and money guidelines. 2 The court observed that the
base offense level for money laundering is either 20 or 23 and the maximum
increase in the base offense level is 13. Thus, the total offense level is based
primarily on the base offense level, not the amount of money involved in the
laundering count.74 Therefore, the court concluded that the amount of money
involved is never as important as the base offense level when determining the
final offense level under § 2Sl. s In contrast, the base offense level for
fraud is 6, and the maximum increase in offense level is 18.76 Because the
increase in the offense level under § 2Fl.1 is based solely on the amount of
money involved77 and the increase can be as much as 400%, the court con-
cluded that total offense level is based primarily on the amount of money
involved.78  Because the final offense level for money laundering is based
primarily on the base offense level and the final offense level for fraud is
based primarily on the amount of money involved, the court ultimately de-
cided that fraud and money laundering counts are not of the same general type
for the purposes of § 3D1.2(d).79
70. See id. at 10 (stating that Application Note Six to § 3D1.2 provides that courts should
group only counts of same general type).
71. USSO § 3D1.2, cmt n.6 (1999).
72. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 10 (stating that offenses are of same general type if guidelines
base offense level primarily on amount of money involved).
73. See USSG § 2Sl.l(a)-(b) (1999) (providing base offense level and specific offense
characteristics for money laundering).
74. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he total offense level
will be based primarily on the base offense level.").
75. See id. ("Thus, even for the largest money laundering scheme, the total offense level
will be based primarily on the base offense level,. . . rather than on the amount of money
involved.").
76. See USSG § 2Fl.1(a)-(b) (1999) (providing base offense level and specific offense
characteristics for fraud).
77. See id. §2F1.1(b) (1999) (showing increasing offense levels as monetary loss in-
creases).
78. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that final offense
levels for larceny, fraud, and embezzlement can range from 333% to 450% of base offense
level).
79. See id. (stating that fraud and money laundering guidelines are not of same general
type because only offense level for fraud is based primarily on amount of money involved).
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The Napoli court also recognized that Application Note 3 to § 3D1.3
could provide valuable guidance." Application Note 3 to § 3D1.3 states that
the guidelines for property offenses of the same general type produce identical
offense levels."1 Looking at the "tables that translate monetary values into
specific offense level[s]," for fraud and money laundering,82 the court noted
that the tables 'tanslate ... at different rates, and at different monetary divi-
sion points."8 3 The court reasoned that this disparity is further proof that the
offenses are of a different general type.84 Thus, having identified § 3D1.2(d)
as the section best suited for the grouping of fraud and money laundering
counts, the court ultimately decided that grouping under § 3D1.2(d) is incon-
sistent with the intent of the Guidelines.85
Finally, with regard to the grouping of fraud and money laundering counts
in general, the Napoli court demonstrated that grouping would produce an
anomalous result in certain cases.8 6 The court illustrated the anomaly with a
hypothetical in which the defendant fraudulently obtained $1,000,000 but
laundered only $100,000.' The court demonstrated that if it did not group the
counts, then the total offense level for the fraud count would be 19 and the total
offense level for the money laundering count would be 20.8 Consequently,
under § 3D 1.4, the total combined offense level for the two groups would be
22.9 However, if a court grouped the counts under § 3D1.2(d), the sentence
is calculated by applying the amount of the aggregate harm to the money
laundering guideline, § 2S 1.1.90 Applying the $1.1 million total to the table in
80. See id. at 11 (stating that Application Note 3 to § 3D1.3 is relevant).
81. USSO § 3D1.3, cmt. n.3 (1999) ("Note that guidelines for similar property offenses
have been coordinated to produce identical offense levels, at least when substantial property
losses are involved."); Napoli, 179 F.3d at 11 (quoting Application Note 3 to USSO § 3D1.3).
82. See USSO §§ 2Fl.l(b), 2Sl.l(b) (1999) (providing tables that give increase in offense
level in relation to value of funds or loss involved).
83. United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1999).
84. See id. at 12 ("These facts suggest, once again, that fraud and money laundering
counts are not of the same 'general type.'").
85. See id. at 10 ("[G]rouping of these two counts was never intended under subsection
(d).").
86. See id. at 12 (stating that grouping fraud and money laundering counts would produce
anomalous results).
87. See id. (stating hypothetical).
88. See id. (stating that total offense level for fraud count is 29 and for money laundering
count is 20).
89. Id.
90. See id. ("[T]he defendant would receive a total combined offense level that is equal
to that of a money laundering charge for $1,100,000."). The Napoli court's determination that
$1,100,000 was the aggregate harm is inconsistent with other circuits. See United States v.
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§ 2S 1.1 (b)(2) results in a total combined offense of 25 for the grouped counts,
a full 3 points higher than the ungrouped counts.91 The court stated that group-
ing "is meant to protect defendants against arbitrary additions resulting from
the government's formal charging decision."' Because grouping actually
would increase the defendant's sentence in these types of cases, the court
concluded that the Sentencing Guidelines must not have contemplated the
grouping of fraud and money laundering counts.'
The Second Circuit, in deciding that fraud and money laundering should
not be grouped, joined several other circuits that have reached the same con-
clusion.94 However, a split in authority exists onthe grouping issue." Several
other circuits have reasoned that fraud and money laundering counts are
grouped properly under §3D1.2.96
Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 166 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that aggregated quantity is total amount
of money involved in scheme); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that aggregated quantity is total amount of funds involved in scheme); cf. USSO
§ 3D1.5, illus. 2 (1999) (stating total value of checks is aggregate harm under § 3D1.3(b) for
offenses grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(d)). Using the rule that the aggregate quantity is the total
amount of money involved in the scheme would result in a aggregated quantity of $1,000,000.
Thus, the total combined offense level is 24. See USSG § 2SI.I(b)(2)(E) (1999) (stating that
increase in offense level is 4 where value of laundered funds is greater than $600,000, but not
greater than $1,000,000).
91. See United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that total offense
level is 25, three points higher than if counts are not grouped).
92. Id.
93. See id. (stating that grouping would defeat policy of grouping rules that protects
defendants from arbitrary charging decisions).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017,1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that grouping is inappropriate under § 3D1.2(d) because fraud and money laundering measure
harm differently); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that
fraud and money laundering counts are not closely related and should not be grouped); United
States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1998).
Without making any determination as to whether there are situations in which the
offense level for money laundering might be largely determined on the basis of total
amount of harm or loss, we are persuaded that, in this case at least, the offense level
for money laundering... does not fall within the purview of subsection (d).
Id.; United States v. Calozza, 125 F.3d'687, 694 (9th Cir. 1997) (Brewster, J., dissenting)
(stating that fraud and money laundering counts do not measure same types of harm); United
States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (same).
95. See infra Part ILB (setting forth reasoning of circuits that group fraud and money
laundering counts).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
grouping is required under § 3D1.2(b) because fraud and money laundering harmed same victim
and all criminal transactions were part of common scheme); United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d
163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that fraud and money laundering are properly grouped under
§ 3D1.2(d)); United States v. Coscarelli 105 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that fraud
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B. Circuits that Group Fraud and Money Laundering
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Wilson' is representa-
tive of the decisions from the circuits that have chosen to group fraud and
money laundering counts.' The Wilson court made several key points that are
common among the grouping circuits. First, the court reasoned that there
would have been no money to launder but for the fraud; therefore, the two
counts were closely related."0 Second, the court reasoned that money laun-
and money laundering "are to be grouped together [under § 3D1.2(d)] because... offenses'
base offense levels are determined largely on the total amount of harm or loss"); United States
v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that fraud and money laundering
counts should have been grouped under subsection (d)); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d
1560, 1564 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (stating that grouping is proper under § 3D1.2(d) because "[w]ith-
out the fraud there would have been no funds to launder").
97. 98 F3d 281 (7th Cir. 1996).
98. See United States v. Vilson, 98 F.3d 281,285 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that court
should have grouped fraud and money laundering counts). In Wilson, the Seventh Circuit
considered whether to group counts of fraud and money laundering. Id. at 282-84. The fraud
and money laundering convictions arose from a ponzi scheme. Id. at 282. The defendant told
investors that their funds were being invested while, in actuality, the defendant used the funds
to pay dividends to previous investors and for his own personal use. Id. First, the court identi-
fied the "central purpose of this section [§ 3Dl2(d)]" as being "'to combine offenses involving
closely related counts."' Id. (quoting United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (11th Cir.
1995)). The court reasoned that fraud and money laundering were closely related in this case
because the money laundering served to conceal the money obtained by fraud. Id. at 283. The
court found that both offenses were integral to the fraudulent scheme. Id. Furthermore, because
the money laundering perpetuated the fraudulent scheme, the court concluded that both offenses
had the same victim. Id. at 283-84. Consequently, the court concluded that "fraud and money
laundering therefore should have been grouped as indicated by subsection (d)." Id. at 284.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
grouping is required under § 3D1.2(b) because fraud and money laundering harmed same victim
and all criminal transactions were part of common scheme); United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d
557, 564 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that fraud and money laundering "counts must be grouped
under § 3D1.2(d) because the money laundering served the necessary purpose of concealing the
fraud"); United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163,167 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that fraud and money
laundering are properly grouped under § 3D1.2(d)); United States v. Coscarelli, 105 F.3d 984,
989 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that fraud and money laundering "are to be grouped together [under
§ 3D1.2(d)] because... the offenses' base offense levels are determined largely on the total
amount of harm or loss"); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560,1564 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (stating
that grouping is proper under § 3D1.2(d) because "[wlithout the fraud there would have been no
funds to launder"); United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1186 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that
fraud and money laundering have same victim and are properly grouped under § 3D1.2(d) if"the
money laundering activities of the defendants perpetuate the underlying crime").
100. See United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281,282-83 (7th Cir. 1996) ("All of the money
that Wilson laundered was money defrauded from his investors, so '[w]ithout the fraud there
would have been no funds to launder.'" (quoting United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564
(1lth Cir. 1995))).
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dering and the fraud are inexorably related when they are integral parts of a
single fraudulent scheme.' Third, the Wilson court concluded that fraud and
money laundering have the same victim when the money laundering serves to
conceal the fraud.1°2
In Wilson, the defendant was a security broker who used a ponzi scheme
to defraud forty-eight victims of more than three million dollars.'03 Wilson
told investors that he was placing their funds in certificates of deposit, annu-
ities, and mutual funds. 104 Wilson, however, deposited the money into his
personal checking account and used the money for his personal expenses and
to pay interest and dividends to other investors.' After he was discovered,
Wilson pled guilty to mail fraud and money laundering charges." 6
At sentencing, the fraud charge and the money laundering charges each
produced a total offense level of 23.107 Because the district court did not
group the fraud and money laundering counts, it applied § 3D 1.410' to arrive
at a total combined offense level of 25."° Had the district court grouped the
fraud and money laundering counts pursuant to § 3D1.2, the total combined
offense level would have been 23.110
To begin its analysis, the Wilson court identified the "central purpose" of
§ 3D 1.2 as "'to combine the offenses involving closely related counts""" and
asserted that 'Wilson's convictions for fraud and money laundering without
question meet this criteria.""' The court then proceeded by addressing the
several reasons supporting its initial assertion that fraud and money laundering
101. See id. at 283-84 ("[The money laundering in this case served to perpetuate the very
scheme that produced the laundered funds.").
102. See id. at 283 ("[T]here is intuitive force to the argument that the victim of the fraud






107. See id. ("The charges of mail fraud and of money laundering each produced an offense
level of 23 under Guidelines sections 2Fl.1 and 2Sl.1 respectively.").
108. See USSO § 3D1.4 (1999) (providing for two-level increase in group with highest
offense level to achieve total combined offense level of two equally serious Groups). Thus, the
total combined offense level for two Groups, each having an offense level of 23, would be 25,
rather than 46.
109. See United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 282. (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that district
court did not group counts and that total combined offense level was 25).
110. See id. at 284 (stating that court should have grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(d) and that
two-level increase pursuant to § 3D 1.4 was erroneous).
111. Id. at 282 (quoting United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560,1564 (llth Cir. 1995)).
112. Id.
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counts are closely related and, thus, properly grouped under § 3D1.2(d)." 3
First, the court reasoned that the laundered money was the same money that
the defendant fraudulently obtained from the investors." 4 Second, the court
recognized that the money laundering was necessary to conceal the fraud and
to allow the scheme to continue to operate." 5 In other words, the court found
that both money laundering and fraud were essential to the success of the
underlying fraudulent scheme." 6 Third, the court noted that § 3D 1.2(d) iden-
tifies both fraud and money laundering counts as among those appropriate for
grouping.117 The court found that although grouping is not automatic for
listed offenses, grouping is appropriate if the offenses are "'of the same gen-
eral type' and the offense level 'is determined largely on the basis of total
113. See id. at 282-84 (stating reasons why fraud and money laundering counts are closely
related); USSG § 3D12(d) (providing for grouping of counts "[w]hen the offense level is
determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss .... or some other measure
of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense
guideline is written to cover such behavior").
114. See United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1996) ("'[W]ithout the
fraud there would have been no funds to launder.'" (quoting United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d
1560,1564 (11th Cir. 1995))). The Wilson court based its reasoning onMullens. Id at 282-83.
In Mullens, the defendant operated a sham investment corporation that was in reality a ponzi
scheme. United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560,1562 (11th Cir. 1995). AfterMullens pleaded
guilty to fraud and money laundering counts, the district court grouped the counts under
§ 3D1.2(d). Id. at 1563. The Mullens court concluded that grouping was proper because fraud
and money laundering convictions are closely related. Id. at 1563-64. Both the fraud and
money laundering counts "were integral cogs in a continuing scheme." Id. at 1564. Further-
more, the Mullens court recognized that "[w]ithout the fraud there would have been no funds
to launder." Id.
115. Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283.
116. See id. ("'[B]oth the fraud and money laundering were integral cogs in continuing the
scheme."' (quoting United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560,1564 (1 th Cir. 1995))).
117. See id. (noting that subsection (d) identifies offenses to be grouped under that sub-
section); see also USSG § 3D1.2(d) (1999) ("Offenses covered by the following guidelines are
to be grouped under this subsection."). Courts have construed the language of § 3D1.2 as not
requiring grouping of offenses merely because they are on the list of offenses to be grouped
despite the "are to be grouped" language of the statute. See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283 ("Grouping
may not be automatic for these offenses simply because they are listed."); see also United
States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 85 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that counts listed on same row
are to be grouped, while counts not on same row may be grouped under § 3D1.2(d)); United
States v. Williams, 154 F.3d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding "no automatic grouping of
counts simply because those counts are on the 'are to be grouped' list"); United States v. Knee-
land, 148 F.3d 6, 16 n.4 (1st Cir. 1998) ("That money laundering may be properly grouped
[with fraud] under subsection (d) in some situations is apparent from the fact that U.S.S.G.
§ 2S1.1 is included in the list of offenses, set forth in subsection (d), that may be grouped
under this subsection."); United States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating
that grouping of counts under § 3D1.2(d) is "not appropriate when the guidelines measure
harm differently").
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amount of harm or loss' as subsection (d) envisions." ' Finally, the court
rejected the view that fraud and money laundering have different victims.' 9
Although the court conceded that fraud and money laundering may have
different victims when viewed in the abstract, on the facts of this case, the
court decided it was best to view the money laundering as hanning the victim
of the underlying fraud. 2 ' Consequently, the court reasoned that when the
money laundering serves to perpetuate the fraudulent scheme, the two activi-
ties cannot be neatly separated and, thus, harm the same victims.
12'
The Wilson court's conclusion is typical of the grouping circuits. The
grouping circuits tend to conclude that if it is difficult to separate the money
laundering from the fraudulent scheme, it is proper to group the fraud and
money laundering counts. Thus, after providing several interrelated rea-
sons, the court concluded that §3D1.2(d) required that the fraud and money
laundering counts be grouped."
The Seventh Circuit's logic in Wilson is not fully representative of the
reasoning of the grouping circuits. For instance, in United States v. Emer-
son, 24 the Seventh Circuit concluded that grouping is automatic when a defen-
dant is convicted under the promotion prong of the money laundering statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(1).'" TheEmerson court statedthatthegovemment
118. Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283 (quoting United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1102 n. 12
(11th Cir. 1996)). For additional sources that agree with the Wilson court, see supra note 99.
119. See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283-84 (stating that victim of money laundering is same as
victim of fraud).
120. See id. ("[T]here is intuitive force to the argument that the victim of the fraud is also
a victim of the transaction designed to hide or 'cleanse' the funds of which she was de-
frauded.").
121. See id. (concluding that fraud and money laundering have same victims when money
laundering perpetuates underlying fraud).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 186 F3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
grouping is required because "all transactions were connected to the kickback scheme"); United
States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that fraud and money laundering
offenses must be grouped because those crimes "involved multiple acts that were linked by a
common illegal objective or part of a common scheme"); United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d
557, 566 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that grouping is required because defendant "embarked upon
hid money laundering scheme with the intent of promoting his mail fraud swindle").
123. See United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281,284 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that fraud and
money laundering counts should have been grouped under § 3D1.2(d)).
124. 128 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1997).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(A)(1) (Supp. 1999); see also United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d
557, 565 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that fraud and money laundering charges should be grouped
when money laundering conviction is under promotion prong of statute). In Emerson, the
Seventh Circuit considered whether to group fraud and money laundering counts under
§ 3D1.2(d). Id. at 564-65. In concluding that it must group the fraud and money laundering
counts, the court emphasized that it had convicted the defendant under the promotion prong of
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must prove that the defendant laundered funds with the intent of promoting
the illegal schemeto obtaina convictionunder 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(1).'26
Therefore, the Emerson court reasoned that the nature of the money launder-
ing charge itself may lead to the conclusion that fraud and money laundering
are closely related.'27 Thus, although the grouping circuits give various rea-
sons for doing so, all of them conclude that courts should group fraud and
money laundering counts under § 3D1.2.
MlL The Impact of the Decision to Charge Money Laundering
Looking at the development of the money laundering guidelines assists
in determining why circuit courts have struggled with the grouping of fraud
and money laundering charges. 2 The money laundering statutes were part
ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.1' Because the United States Sentencing
Commission (Sentencing Commission) did not have the benefit of judicial
interpretations when it drafted the guidelines for money laundering in 1987,
it drafted the guidelines on the premise that they would apply only in limited
circumstances, namely when the financial transactions "encouraged or facili-
tated the commission of further crimes." 30
the money laundering statute. Id. at 565. Because the government proved that the defendant
laundered the proceeds of his mail fraud scheme with the intent of promoting that illegal
scheme," the counts were closely related. Id. Thus, the court concluded that when the govern-
ment charges a defendant under the promotion prong of the money laundering statute, the under-
lying fraud counts is properly grouped with money laundering count under § 3D12(d). Id.
126. SeeEmerson, 128 F.3dat565 ("[T]heevidence attrialdemonstratedthatEmersonlaun-
dered the proceeds of his mail fraud schemewith the intent ofpromoting that illegal scheme.").
127. See id. (stating that fraud and money laundering charges should be grouped when
money laundering conviction is under promotion prong of statute); see also United States v.
Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding fraud and money laundering counts closely
related). The Walker court stated as follows:
Walker's money laundering was part of his fraudulent scheme because the funds
were used to make fictitious interest payments. In effect, Walker conceded the
offenses were closely related when he pleaded guilty to money laundering under the
particular provision of the statute that forbids conducting financial transactions
involving the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity with the intent to promote
the carrying on of [the] specified unlawful activity.
Walker, 112 F.3d at 167.
128. See USSG § 281.1 (1999) (providing money laundering guideline); U.S. SENTENCING
CoMM'N,REPoRTTonTECONGRESs: SENnhNcIN(POuCYIORMONEYLAUNDERINGOFFENSES,
IxLuDigGCoMMNTs ONDEPARTENTFJUsTIcEREPORT3-5 (1997) (discussing development
and structure of current money laundering sentencing guidelines), available at http'/lwww.ussc.
gov/legist.htm [hereinafter SENTENCNG COMMISSION REPORT] (last visited Apr. 15,2001).
129. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 stat 3207-1818 (1986).
130. SENTNCING COMMIs5IoNREPORT, supra note 128, at 3-4 (quoting USSG § 2S1.1,
cmt. background).
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Not long after the new guidelines had been in place, the Sentencing Com-
mission received numerous negative comments on the operation of the money
laundering guidelines."' As a result, the Sentencing Commission undertook
two studies, one in 1992 and a second in 1995, to focus on two troublesome
types of cases including the type of case in which both fraud and money
laundering were charged as separate offenses."3 The Sentencing Commission
found the following:
The Commission's long-term analysis of money laundering cases also
demonstrated that the intended relationship between the harm caused and
the measurement of the offense seriousness under the money laundering
sentencing guidelines has become distorted. Individuals who engaged in
essentiallythe same offense conductreceived substantially higher or lower
sentences, depending on whether they were charged, convicted, and sen-
tenced under the underlying offense-related statute, orthe money launder-
ing statute, or both .... To illustrate this phenomenon, consider that,
under the current sentencing guidelines, a first-time offender who fraudu-
lently obtains $20,000 of insurance payments and conducts routine finan-
cial transactions with the proceeds may be incarcerated for an 8- to 14-
month period if charged and sentenced only for mail fraud. In contrast,
that same offender would be subject to a 33- to 41-monthperiod of incar-
ceration if charged and sentenced for money laundering. 3
The Sentencing Commission also found that sentencing disparities oc-
curred as a matter of course, depending on whether or not money laundering
was charged in addition to the fraud count. 4 The Sentencing Commission
found that the decision to charge money laundering in addition to an underlying
fraud-related offense would raise the sentence 85 to 95 percent of the time.'35
This telling statistic may explain why courts have had such a difficult time
interpreting the grouping rules when the counts include fraud and money
laundering.
In an attempt to remedy the problem of disparate results that occur when
money laundering is charged with fraud, 3 ' the Sentencing Commission pro-
posed a comprehensive rewrite of § 2S1.1 to Congress in 1995.' These
131. Id. at 5.
132. See id. (stating that Sentencing Commission reported on sentencing disparity in cases
where both fraud and money laundering were charged).
133. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id.
136. See id. (stating that potential for disparate results reinforces need for fundamental
revisions).
137. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg.
25,074, 25,085-86 (1995) (proposed May 10, 1995) (proposing new money laundering guide-
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revisions would have tied the money laundering offense level to the offense
level of the conduct that produced the funds.13 Congress, however, disap-
proved of the guideline revisions, leaving the money laundering guidelines as
they were when first promulgated in 1987.139 As a result, the current state of
affairs is an environment where disparity and disproportionality result from
the inconsistent use of money laundering charges and its inflexible guideline
structure.
140
The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Smith141 is an example
of the extreme measures to which courts may resort to deal with the harshness
of the money laundering guideline as compared to the fraud guideline.142 Al-
though grouping was not at issue in Smith, the opinion represents a judicial
backlash against operation ofthe money laundering guideline in fraud cases. 43
line). Recently, the Sentencing Commission has again proposed an amendment to USSO § 2S1.1
that closely resembles the 1995 proposed guideline. 66 Fed. Reg. 8012-16 (2001). The amend-
ment is not yet in final form, but the Department of Justice has already voiced its opposition.
Unites States Sentencing Commission, 2001 Public Hearing 3 (March 19, 2001), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/Pubhmg2001.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2001). The Department
of Justice's concerns are similar to those voiced by the House Judiciary Committee when it dis-
approved the 1995 amendment Compare id. (stating that proposed guideline would lower
sentences for most serious forms of money laundering), with H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at4 (1995)
("[S]tiff sentences, which treat the act of money laundering itself as a serious offense should be
preserved.").
138. SENTENCING CoMMISsIoNREPoRT, supra note 128, at 2 (stating that offense level of
underlying crime be used as starting point for money laundering offense level).
139. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. L. 104-38 (1995)
(disapproving Sentencing Commission's proposed changes to money laundering guideline);
SENTENciNG COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 2 (reporting disapproval by Congress in
1995 of Sentencing Commission's proposed amendment affecting money laundering guideline).
140. See SENTENCiNGCOMMIssiONREPORT, supranote 128, at9 (statingthatinconsistent
use of money laundering charges is resulting in sentencing disparity and disproportionality).
141. 186 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1999)
142. See United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290,300 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that defendant's
behavior was notwithin "heartland" of money laundering guideline). In Smith, the Third Circuit
decided that the sentencing court erred in refusing to depart from USSO §§ 3D1.3-1.4. Id. at
300. USSO § 3D1.3 instructs the sentencing court to calculate the offense level of a Group using
the highest offense level corresponding to a count in the Group. Id. at 297. The court reasoned
that the money laundering statutes address only serious criminal activity such as significant drug
trafficking operations and organized crime. Id. at 298-99. Therefore, the court concluded that
money laundering activity that occurs incidental to routine fraud cases is outside the "heartland"
of the money laundering statute. Id. at 300. Consequently, the court decided that "the overarch-
ing directive to match the guideline to the offense conduct which formed the basis of the
underlying conviction" mandated the court to apply the fraud guideline instead of the money
laundering guideline. Id. (quoting United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435,1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
143. See SENTENCING COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 8 ("Judicial dissatisfaction
with the broad reach of the money laundering guidelines has often resulted in a determination
that the actual conduct for which the defendant was convicted was outside the 'heartland' of the
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Therefore, this Note examines the reasoning of the Smith court to better illus-
trate the sentencing disparity that the money laundering guideline causes. 1"
A fuller understanding of the sentencing disparity that the money laundering
guideline causes is necessary to construct an effective solution to the grouping
split.
1 45
In Smith, the defendant was convicted of participating in an embezzle-
ment and kickback scheme." 6 Defendant Smith worked as a sales representa-
tive for a corporation, GTECI-, that provided lottery services to a number of
states.147 In the course of seeking lucrative state contracts, GTECH hired
consultant companies to help introduce GTECH to influential state poli-
ticians. 148 While trying to land contracts in New Jersey and Delaware, Smith
used two consulting firms, Benchmark Enterprises, Inc. and Sambucca Con-
sultants, Inc., owned by co-defendants. 149 During this time, Benchmark made
a series of kickback payments totaling $169,500to Smith, and Smith awarded
a contract worth $10,000 monthly to a third company owned by two co-
defendants who did no actual work for GTECHY
Smith was convicted on one count of conspiracy to defraud and fifteen
counts of money laundering, among other counts.' The court grouped all of
the counts into a single group under § 3D1.2(b) because the counts involved
a common criminal objective and the same victim. 52 Neither party challenged
the grouping in this case."5 3 However, the defendants challenged the calcula-
tion of the final combined offense level under § 3D1.41 4 The defendants
contended that the sentencing court erred when it did not depart from the rule
in § 3D1.4 requiring the group's offense level be determined by the count in
money laundering guidelines... thereby justifying a substantial downward departure." (foot-
note omitted)).
144. See id. ("[D]isparate sentencing persists as a result of the structure of the current
money laundering guidelines.").
145. See id. (noting that disparate sentencing persists as result of money laundering
guideline, and such disparate sentencing reinforces need for fundamental revisions).
146. See United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 292 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that multiple
defendants were convicted of "charges arising out of an embezzlement/kickback scheme"). For
simplicity, this Note focuses on defendant Smith's sentence to illustrate the sentencing disparity






152. See id. at 297 (stating grouping was appropriate under § 3D1.2(b)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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the group with the highest offense level."' 5 The district court used the money
laundering guideline to calculate the offense level for the single Group and
arrived at a total offense level of 25. 16 This guideline choice resulted in a
sentencing range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months.5 7 Had the district
court used the fraud guideline, the offense level would have been 13.5' Thus,
the resulting sentencing range would have been twelve to eighteen months, a
difference of at least thirty-nine months.5 9
The Smith court agreed with the defendants and directed the district court
to calculate the final combined offense level of the group using the fraud guide-
line. 6 ' The court reasoned that the "heartland" of USSG § 2S1.1 is money
laundering activity that is connected with more serious crimes like large-scale
drug trafficking. 6' Furthermore, the court asserted that applying the money
laundering guideline to this case would let "the tail wag the dog."162 The court
reasoned that the "overarching directive to match the guideline to the offense
conduct which formed the basis for the underlying conviction" was con-
trolling. 163 Consequently, the court directed the district court to apply the fraud
guidelines instead of the money laundering guideline on resentencing.'"
Thus, the dilemma which courts face is multifaceted. 65 First, courts
must grapple with the money laundering charge itself and decide whether the
charge reflects the type of conduct that Congress intended to punish. 66 The
155. See id. ("[T]he sentencing judge was instructed by USSG § 3D1 .4 to use the highest
offense level corresponding to the counts in the unit.").
156. See id. ("The sentencing judge chose the laundering violation level."); id. at 297 n.3
(stating Smith's sentence was based on an offense level of 25).
157. Id. at 297.
158. See id. at 297 n.2 (stating that fraud guideline would have produced offense level of
13).
159. See USSG ch. 5, pt. A (1999) (providing sentencing table). Thirty-nine is the differ-
ence between the minimum of the fifty-seven to seventy-one month range and the maximum of
the twelve to eighteen month range.
160. See id. at 300 ("[W]e direct the use of the fraud guidelines rather than that for money
laundering.").
161. See id. ("[T]he heartland of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 is the money laundering activity
connected with extensive drug trafficking and serious crime.").




165. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (describing impact of the charging
decision).
166. See SENTENCING COMMISSIONREPORT, supra note 128, at 11 ("[Money laundering
charges '.. . should not be used in cases where the money laundering activity prosecuted is
minimal orincidental to the underlying crime.'" (quoting DEPARTMENT oF JUSTICE, REPORTFOR
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current money laundering guideline results in arbitrary charging decisions that
have too great an effect on the ultimate sentence in fraud cases.' 67 Second,
courts that find the money laundering charge appropriate must struggle with
the grouping decision.'68 Because most courts read the money laundering
guideline expansively, 169 the grouping conflict results in a pervasive problem
of inconsistent sentences for identical criminal conduct. 7° Therefore, the
solution to the problems that arise from sentencing fraud and money launder-
ing counts must address the grouping decision. Additionally, the solution to
the grouping split should remedy the adverse effects of the charging decision.
IV Comparing the Policies of the Sentencing Guidelines with the
Policies that Underlie the Decisions of the Circuit Courts
A. The Policies of the Sentencing Guidelines
The policies of the Sentencing Guidelines are threefold.'7 First, the
Sentencing Guidelines seek to combat crime with a fair and effective sentenc-
ing system."' This policy statement is of little guidance because notions of
fairness and effectiveness are far ranging. The second objective is to seek
reasonable uniformity in sentencing for those who commit similar offenses.'73
The uniformity policy informs the search for a solution to the fraud and money
laundering split.'74 Because the split creates sentencing disparity, the unifor-
THE SENATE AND HousE JUDICIARY CoMMrmTEEs ON THE ARGINGAND PLEA PRACTICES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS WITHRESPECTTOT OFFENSEOFMONEYLAUNDERING 14 (1996))).
167. See SENTENCING COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 128, at 7 ("Individuals who en-
gaged in essentially the same offense conduct received substantially higher or lower sentences,
depending on whether they were charged, convicted, and sentenced under the underlying
offense-related statute, or the money laundering statute, or both.") (footnote omitted).
168. See SENTENCiNG COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at7 n.16 ("This situation is
further complicated by the inconsistent application of the multiple count and grouping guide-
lines (USSG §§ 3D1.1-3D1.5).").
169. See id. at 5 ("One of the most salient conclusions of the Commission's multi-year
study was that money laundering sentences are being imposed for a much broader scope of
offense conduct, including some conduct that is substantially less serious than the conduct
contemplated when the money laundering guidelines were first formulated.").
170. See supra notes 1-30 and accompanying text (illustrating effect of grouping decision
on sentencing in fraud and money laundering cases).
171. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (1999) (stating that Congress had three
objectives in enacting Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
172. See id. ("The Act's basic objective was to enhance the ability of the criminal justice
system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.").
173. See id. (stating that policy is to seek "reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrow-
ing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar
offenders").
174. See United States v. Ferrouillet, No. 96-198, 1997 WL 266627, at *8 (E.D. La. May
20, 1997) (stating that "[uinvoking the money laundering statute" in fraud case "could directly
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mity policy charges Congress and the Sentencing Commission to resolve
divisive split among the circuit courts.' 75 Third, the Sentencing Guidelines
seek proportionality in sentencing by imposing appropriately more severe
sentences for more serious criminal conduct." 6 The current state of affairs in
fraud and money laundering cases implicates the proportionality policy.17 The
disparate sentencing of defendants charged with fraud and money laundering
casts the proportionality policy into disarray because the impact that the
additional money laundering conduct has on the overall sentence varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction-'78
In addition to the policy objectives that inform analysis of the guidelines
as a whole, 79 the Sentencing Guidelines also advance policy justifications for
the grouping rules.' First, the grouping rules seek to limit the effect that the
formal charging decision has on the ultimate sentence by preventing multiple
punishment for similar offenses.' Only offenses that represent additional
criminal conduct result in a sentence enhancement." Second, the grouping
rules promote the policy of incremental punishment. 83 Incremental punish-
ment, like proportionality, means that significant criminal conduct, in addition
controvert the... objectives of the [Sentencing] Commission, uniformity and proportionality
in sentencing").
175. See SENUNCINGCOMMISIONREPORT, supra note 128, at 10 (stating that Sentencing
Commission's objective, in part, in reforming money laundering guideline is to avoid sentenc-
ing disparity); H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 17 (1995) ("[O]ne of the fundamental goals of the
Sentencing Reform Act- avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity for similar offense conduct-
has not been achieved to the extend [sic] it should in this area.").
176. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt (1999) (stating goal to achieve "proportion-
ality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal
conduct of differing severity").
177. Cf supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing impact of court choosing
money laundering guideline in sentencing fraud and money laundering cases).
178. Cf SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 2 (stating that purpose of
Sentencing Commission's proposed amendment to money laundering guideline was to make
penalties "more proportionate to both the seriousness of the underlying criminal conduct from
which the laundered funds were derived and to the nature and seriousness of the laundering
conduct itself').
179. See supra notes 171-78 (discussing policies of Sentencing Guidelines).
180. See USSG ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt (1999) (stating reasoning behind grouping
rules).
181. See id. (stating that purpose of grouping rules is "to limit the significance of the
formal charging decision and to prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical offense
conduct").
182. See id. (stating that purpose of grouping rules is to prevent convictions on multiple
counts from resulting in "sentence enhancement unless they represent additional conduct that
is not otherwise accounted for by the guidelines").
183. See id. ("The rules in this Part seek to provide incremental punishment for significant
additional criminal conduct").
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to a given offense, increases the sentence over and above the sentence that a
court would have imposed for the given offense alone."8 4 Third, it is the
policy of the grouping rules to group both counts that are interrelated and
counts that deal with repetitive or ongoing conduct.18
The question of whether fraud and money laundering counts are closely
related within the meaning of the grouping rules is an argument that is based
on policy issues.8 6 When courts group criminal counts, the guidelines treat
the counts as a single offense.187 It is clear that the structure of both the
money laundering guideline and the fraud guideline allows the Guidelines to
deal effectively with repetitive or ongoing behavior.' For fraud counts, the
structure of the guideline allows for easy treatment of multiple fraud counts
because the specific offense characteristic section provides increases in offense
level as the amount of monetary loss increases."8 9 Similarly, the structure of
the money laundering guideline, provides for increasing offense levels as the
value of the laundered funds increases.1"e Thus, the challenge that the courts
face in making the grouping decision is in determining whether the apparent
similarities of two offenses means that they are related within the spirit of the
grouping rules.' 9'
A sensible solution to the grouping question must further both the general
policy objectives of the Sentencing Guidelines and of the grouping rules.
184. Id.
185. See id. (stating that closely interrelated counts and counts that deal with ongoing and
repetitive behavior are grouped).
186. Cf id. (stating that closely related offenses are grouped).
187. See id. (stating that "counts that are grouped together are treated as constituting a
single offense for the purposes of the guidelines").
188. See USSG § 2Fl.l(b)(1) (1999) (providing incremental increases in offense level as
value of monetary loss increases); id. § 2S1.1 (b)(2) (providing incremental increases in offense
level as value of laundered funds increases).
189. See id. § 2F1.I(bX1) (providing incremental increases in offense level as value of
monetary loss increases).
190. See id. § 2S1.1(b)(2) (providing incremental increases in offense level as value of
laundered funds increases).
191. Compare, e.g., United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that
district court was correct to "calculate Napoli's sentence on the basis of separate groups for his
fraud and money laundering counts") and United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1531 (10th
Cir. 1995) (stating that grouping of fraud and money laundering counts is improper under
§ 3D1.2(b) or § 3D1.2(d) because of difference "in the nature and measure of harm resulting
from these offenses" and because fraud and money laundering have different victims), with
United States v. Coscarelli, 105 F3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that fraud and money
laundering "are to be grouped together [under § 3Dl.2(d)] because ... [these] offenses' base
offense levels are determined largely on the total amount of harm or loss") and United States
v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281,283-84 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that fraud and money laundering
counts should have been grouped because fraud and money laundering part of same scheme and
have same victim).
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Furthermore, the solution must consider the policy choices inherent in Con-
gress's decision to disapprove the Sentencing Commission's proposed com-
prehensive revision to the money laundering guideline in 1995." When it
rejected the Sentencing Commission's complete revision to the money laun-
dering guideline, the House Judiciary Committee voiced specific policy con-
cerns. 93 The Judiciary Committee stated the following:
Prosecutors would be deprived of an important law enforcement tool ifthe
Commission's money laundering amendment took effect. The current
moneylaunderingpenalties are a critical means ofattacking criminal enter-
prises that engage in a wide variety of illegal activities, and whose very
192. See H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 4 (1995) (stating reasons for recommending disap-
proval of Sentencing Commission's proposed changes to money laundering guideline).
193. See id. (stating reasons for recommending disapproval of Sentencing Commission's
proposed changes to money laundering guideline); Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25085-86 (1995) (proposed May 10, 1995)
(stating proposed guideline) The proposed guideline reads as follows:
§2S1.1 Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging in Monetary Transactions
in Property Derived from Unlawful Activity
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest):
(1) The offense level for the underlying offense from which the funds were derived,
if the defendant committed the underlying offense (or otherwise would be account-
able for the commission of the underlying offense under 1.3 (Relevant Conduct))
and the offense level for that offense can be determined; or
(2) [12] plus the number of offense levels from the table in §2F1.1 (Fraud and
Deceit) corresponding to the value of the funds, if the defendant knew or believed
that the funds were the proceeds of an offense involving the manufacture, importa-
tion, or distribution of controlled substances [or listed chemicals; a crime of
violence; or an offense involving firearms or explosives, national security, or
international terrorism]; or
(3) [8] plus the number of offense levels from the table in §2Fl .1 (Fraud and Deceit)
corresponding to the value of the funds.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the defendant knew or believed that (A) the financial or monetary transac-
tions, transfers transportation, or transmissions were designed in whole or in part
to conceal or disguise the proceeds of criminal conduct, or (B) the funds were to be
used to promote further criminal conduct, increase by 2 levels.
(2) If subsection (b)(1XA) is applicable and the offense (A) involved placement of
funds into, or movement of funds through or from, a company or financial institu-
tion outside the United States, or (B) otherwise involved a sophisticated form of
money laundering, increase by 2 levels.
Application Notes
2. If the defendant is to be sentenced both on a count for an offense from which the
funds were derived and on a count under this guideline, the counts will be grouped
together under subsection (c) of §3D1.2 (Groups of Closely- Related Counts).
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existence depends ontheir ability to deposit and launderthe proceeds from
these activities. Consequently, stiff sentences, which treatthe act of money
laundering itself as a serious offense, should be preserved. 
1 4
The Judiciary Committee's report makes apparent Congress's desire to pro-
vide incremental punishment for the additional money laundering conduct. 95
To understand the effect that the Sentencing Commission's proposed
guideline would have had on a typical case involving fraud and money laun-
dering counts, it is best to return to the opening hypothetical. 96 Recall that
federal district courts in different jurisdictions convicted Smith and Brown for
their respective fraudulent schemes under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.1' Both courts
calculated the amount ofmoney fraudulently obtained at $500,000. Addition-
ally, the courts convicted the defendants of laundering $500,000 under 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B). 19 The fraud count yielded an offense level of 20."
The Sentencing Commission's disapproved guideline would have used 20 as
the base offense level for money laundering.2" The specific offense charac-
teristic ofknowledge would have increased the offense level by 2 levels.2 ' The
disapproved guideline would have grouped the charges under §3D1.2(b)." 2
Under § 3D1.3(a), the final offense level for the Group would have been 22.2°3
Thus, under the disapproved guideline the final offense level would have been
less than that of both the grouping and nongrouping circuits under the current
Sentencing Guidelines.2°
194. H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at4 (1995).
195. See id. (stating that money laundering penalties are important tool in combating
criminal enterprises); USSO ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (1999) ("The rules in this Part seek
to provide incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct").
196. See supra notes 1-30 and accompanying text (describing this Note's hypothetical).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1999).
198. Id. § 1956(aXl)(B).
199. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (showing calculation of offense level for
fraud count).
200. See supra note 193 (providing disapproved guideline which states that base offense
level is "[the offense level for the underlying offense from which the funds were derived").
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(aXl)(B) (Supp. 1999) (stating that knowledge is element);
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074,25085
(proposed May 10, 1995) (stating that base offense level is "[tihe offense level for the underly-
ing offense from which the funds were derived").
202. See supra note 193 (providing disapproved guideline which states that money count
is to be grouped with underlying offense).
203. See USSO § 3D1.3(a) (1999) (stating that offense level for Group is offense level of
most serious count in Group).
204. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (stating that final offense level for non-
grouping circuit was 25 and final offense level for grouping circuit was 23).
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When Congress disapproved the Sentencing Commission's proposed
guideline, it was concerned with the guideline's lenity." 5 Accordingly, any
proposal to change the money laundering guideline must address Congress's
desire to provide significant punishment for money laundering offenses. °6
Thus, the challenge is to find a solution to the grouping split that reduces the
undesirable effects of the charging decision, yet maintains stiff penalties for
money laundering offenses, especially those that "obscure the origins of illicit
funds" and are associated with drug trafficking or substantial criminal enter-
prises.2°
B. The Policies Furthered by the Nongrouping Circuits
One common theme of the nongrouping circuits is that fraud and money
laundering measure different types of harm."° Some of the nongrouping
circuits reason that fraud and money laundering measure different types of
harm because fraud and money laundering harm different victims.2" Addi-
205. See H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 4 (1995) (stating that "stiff sentences, which treat the
act of money laundering itself as a serious offense, should be preserved").
206. See id. (stating that "stiff sentences, which treat the act of money laundering itself as
a serious offense, should be preserved").
207. SENTENcING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 10.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that grouping is inappropriate under § 3D1.2(d) because fraud and money laundering measure
harm differently); United States v. O'Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that
grouping under § 3D1.2(d) is not appropriate because money laundering has eleven-point higher
base offense level than fraud); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 1998)
('While both measures address the relative scope of the illegal activity, they do not measure the
same type of harm."); United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that
"subsection (d) does not encompass Kneeland's fraud and money laundering convictions
because the offense level for money laundering is generally not determined on the basis of total
harm"); United States v. Calozza, 125 F.3d 687, 694 (9th Cir. 1997) (Brewster, J., dissenting)
("Because these two count groups do not involve substantially the same harm, they are treated
as separate count groups."); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1531 (10th Cir. 1995)
(stating that grouping of fraud and money laundering counts is improper under § 3D1.2(b) or
§ 3Dl.2(d) because of difference "in the nature and measure of harm resulting from these
offenses" and because fraud and money laundering have different victims); United States v.
Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 570 (1st Cir. 1993) (refusing to group under § 3Dl.2(b) because "the
victim of fraud is the insurance company and the victim of money laundering is society");
United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that fraud and money
laundering should not be grouped because measurement of harm for fraud is fundamentally
different than measurement of harm for money laundering).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Napoli 179 F.3d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that fraud and
money laundering have different victims); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F3d 1522,1531 (10th
Cir. 1995) (stating that grouping of fraud and money laundering counts is improper under
§ 3D1.2(b) or § 3D1.2(d) because fraud and money laundering have different victims); United
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tionally, many of the nongrouping circuits reason that the fraud and money
laundering guidelines measure harms of a different nature.21 Thus, the non-
grouping circuits seek to further the policies of proportionality and incre-
mental punishment by interpreting the grouping rules consistently with these
policies."' The nongrouping circuits, by not grouping the charges, turn to
§ 3D1.4 to account for the additional harm."' Section 3D1.4 subjects the
defendant to additional, incremental punishment for the additional criminal
conduct by increasing the total combined offense level as the number of
Groups increases.2" 3 Finally, the nongrouping circuits seek to limit the signifi-
cance of the formal charging decision.214 Thus, the policies that the non-
grouping circuits further by choosing notto group fraud and money laundering
counts are the very policies thatthe Sentencing Guidelines purport to further." 5
C. The Policies Furthered by the Grouping Circuits
In contrast to the nongrouping circuits, the grouping circuits have decided
that fraud and money laundering are closely interrelated within the meaning of
the grouping rules.2"6 Some of the grouping circuits reason that fraud and
States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 570 (1st Cir. 1993) (refusing to group under § 3D1.2(b)
because "the victim of fraud is the insurance company and the victim of money laundering is
society").
210. See, e.g., United States v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that grouping is inappropriate under § 3D1.2(d) because fraud and money laundering measure
harm differently); Napoli, 179 F.3d at 3 (stating that fraud and money laundering measure harm
in different ways); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that fraud and money laundering should not be grouped because measurement of harm for fraud
is fundamentally different than measurement of harm for money laundering).
211. See United States v. O'Kane, 155 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that incre-
mental punishment is guiding for interpreting grouping rules); Lombardi, 5 F.3d at 571 (stating
that additional punishment for money laundering is result "of a deliberate policy choice by
Congress").
212. See USSG § 3D1.4 (1999) (providing rules for determining final combined offense
level when there are multiple Groups).
213. See id. (providing increase in total combined offense level based on number and
severity of Groups).
214. See Napoli, 179 F.3d at 12 (stating that effect of decision not to group "is meant to
protect defendants against arbitrary additions resulting from the government's formal charging
decision"); see also USSG ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (1999) (stating that policy of grouping
rules is to limit significance of charging decision).
215. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (1999) (noting policy of proportionality in
sentencing); id. ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (stating policy of incremental punishment and
policy of limiting significance of charging decision).
216. See id. ch. 3, pt D, introductory cmt. ("When offenses are closely interrelated, group
them together for purposes of the multiple-count rules, and use only the offense level for the
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money laundering are interrelated because they harmthe same victim.217 Addi-
tionally, some of the grouping circuits conclude that fraud and money launder-
ing involve substantially the same harm because both measure harm in terms
of monetary amounts.21 Finally, most of the grouping circuits conclude that
fraud and money are interrelated because the act of money laundering furthers
the fraudulent scheme.219 Whatever the reasoning, the decision to group the
charges reflects the desire of the grouping circuits to minimize the impact of
most serious offense in that group."); see also, e.g., United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 297
(3d Cir. 1999) (deciding that grouping is required under § 3D1.2(b) because fraud and money
laundering harmed same victim and all criminal transactions were part of common scheme);
United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 1997) (declaring that fraud and money
laundering "counts must be grouped under § 3D1.2(d) because the money laundering served the
necessary purpose of concealing the fraud"); United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th
Cir. 1997) (stating that fraud and money laundering are closely related and properly grouped
under § 3D1.2(d)); United States v. Coscarelli, 105 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
fraud and money laundering "are to be grouped together [under § 3D1.2(d)] because. .. (these]
offenses' base offense levels are determined largely on the total amount of harm or loss");
United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1564 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (stating that grouping is proper
under § 3D1.2(d) because "[w]ithout the fraud there would have been no funds to launder");
United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1186 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that fraud and money
laundering have same victim and are properly grouped under § 3D1.2(d) when "the money
laundering activities of the defendants perpetuate the underlying crime").
217. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1999) (deciding that
grouping is required under § 3D1.2(b) because fraud and money laundering harm same victim);
United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is intuitive force to the
argument that the victim of the fraud is also the victim of the transaction designed to hide or
'cleanse' the funds of which she was defrauded."); United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181,
1186 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that fraud and money laundering have the same victim).
218. See United States v. Coscarelli, 105 F.3d 984,989 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that fraud
and money laundering "are to be grouped together [under § 3D1.2(d)] because... [these]
offenses' base offense levels are determined largely on the total amount of harm or loss"); see
also USSO ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (1999) (discussing grouping of counts that base
offense level primarily on amount of money involved). The comment states as follows:
If the offense guidelines in Chapter Two base the offense level primarily on the
amount of money or quantity of substance involved (e.g., theft, fraud, drug traffick-
ing, firearms dealing), or otherwise contain provisions dealing with repetitive or
ongoing misconduct (e.g., many environmental offenses), add the numerical quan-
tities and apply the pertinent offense guideline, including any specific offense char-
acteristics for the conduct taken as a whole.
Id.
219. See, e.g., Smith, 186 F.3d at 297 (deciding that grouping is required under § 3D1.2(b)
because fraud and money laundering were part of common scheme); United States v. Walker,
112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that fraud and money laundering counts were
properly grouped because money laundering furthered fraudulent scheme by making fictitious
interest payments); United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 564 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that
fraud and money laundering "counts must be grouped under § 3D1.2(d) because the money
laundering served the necessary purpose of concealing the fraud").
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the charging decision." The decision to group limits the significance of the
charging decision by eliminating the possibility that § 3D1.4 will increase the
total combined offense level.22 Once a court decides to group fraud and
money laundering, the grouping rules treat the fraud and money laundering
counts as one offense.2 Consequently, the grouping circuits further the policy
of preventing multiple punishment for the same offense.' Additionally, the
grouping circuits further the policy of'proportionality in sentencing, in spite of
the decision to group the fraud and money laundering counts, because the
money laundering count's offense level typically increases the Group's offense
level.2 4 Thus, grouping punishes money laundering conduct by giving a more
severe sentence than would be given in cases in which only fraud is charged.'
Like the nongrouping circuits' decision, the grouping circuits' decision to
group fraud and money laundering finds support in the policies that underpin
the Sentencing Guidelines.22
220. See USSG ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (1999) (stating that policy of grouping rules
is to limit effect of formal charging decision).
221. Id. § 3DI.4 (providing for total combined offense level more severe than most serious
Group if other Groups have similar offense levels); id. § 3DI.3(b) ("In the case of counts
grouped together pursuant to § 3D1.2(d), the offense level applicable to the Group is the offense
level corresponding to the aggregated quantity."); id. § 3D1.3(a) (stating that offense level for
counts grouped under § 3D1.2 (a)-(c) is offense level of most serious count in group).
222. See id. at ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. ("In essence counts that are grouped together
are treated as constituting a single offense for purposes of the guidelines.").
223. See id. (stating that grouping prevents multiple punishment for substantially identical
offense conduct).
224. See id. § 3D1.3 (providing procedure for determining offense level of Group of
closely related counts). Under § 3Dl.3(a), the offense level of the Group is the offense level
of the most serious count in the Group. Id. § 3D1.3(a). Because money laundering counts
usually have a higher offense level than fraud counts, the offense level of the Group is usually
the offense level of the money laundering count Cf. SMTCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 128, at 8 (stating that "election to pursue a money laundering charge in addition to an
underlying fraud-related offense would raise the guideline penalty in 85 to 95 percent of the
cases"). Section 3D1.3(b) calculates the offense level of the Group by applying the aggregated
amount of money involved in the counts of the Group to the guideline that yields the highest
offense level. USSG § 3D1.3(b) (1999). The money laundering guideline normally yields the
highest offense level. Cf. S rENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 8 (stating that
choosing money laundering guideline normally results in higher penalty); see also USSG ch.
1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (1999) (stating that proportionality in sentencing is goal of guide-
lines); id. at ch. 3, pt D, introductory cmt. ("The rules in this Part seek to provide incremental
punishment for significant additional criminal conduct").
225. See SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 8 (stating that "election to
pursue a money laundering charge in addition to an underlying fraud-related offense would raise
the guideline penalty in 85 to 95 percent of cases").
226. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text (illustrating that policy goals of Sen-
tencing Guidelines support reasoning of nongrouping circuits).
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V A Proposal for Proportionality and Fairness
A. The Solution
The current guideline regime provides no clearly correct way to treat fraud
and money laundering counts under the grouping rules. Therefore, the solution
to the grouping split should eliminate the grouping decision altogether. This
Note's solution to the fraud and money laundering circuit split is embodied in
a proposed money laundering guideline.227 The proposed money laundering
guideline to replace current § 2S 1.1 reads, in pertinent parts, as follows:
§ 2S1.1 Laundering ofMonetary Instruments
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greater):
(1) The total offense level of the underlying offense, including
specific offense characteristics, if the defendant is account-
able for the underlying offense. "Underlying offense," asused
in this guideline, means the offense that the laundering of
monetary instruments facilitated or the offense that generated
the funds that were subsequently laundered.
(2) If the offense level of the underlying offense cannotbe deter-
mined, the offense level is 8 plus the number of offense levels
from the table in § 2F1.1.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics:
(1) Ifthe defendantknew orbelieved thatthe funds were the pro-
ceeds of an offense involving the manufacture, importation,
or distribution of controlled substances [or listed chemicals];
a crime ofviolence; or an offense involving firearms, explo-
sives, or national security, increase by 4 levels.
(2) Ifconvictedunder 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), or
(a)(3)(A), increase by 2 levels.
(3) If sophisticated means are employed to conceal the source of
the funds, increase by 2 levels.
227. Of course, a new money laundering guideline will impact many types of cases, not just
those that include fraud and money laundering counts. It is beyond the scope of this Note,
however, to discuss the impacts on other types of cases. Nonetheless, given the tremendous
criticism that courts and practitioners have directed at the money laundering guideline, it would
be unwise and impractical to address the fraud and money laundering split without remedying
the flaws inthe money laundering guideline. See SENTENCINGCOMMIsSIONREPORTsupra note
128, at 5 (stating that Congress, judges and practitioners have criticized operation of money
laundering guidelines). Furthermore, any attempt to address cases only in which money laun-
dering is charged in addition to an underlying fraud count would be too complex and confusing
because separate guidelines and rules would have to be developed to deal with such a situation.
See USSO ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt (1999) ("The larger the number of subcategories of
offense and offender characteristics included in the guidelines, the greater the complexity and
the less workable the system.").
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(4) Increase the offense level as follows, according to the value
of funds laundered:
Value (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level
(A) $100,000 or less add I
(B) More than $100,000 add 2
(C) More than $500,000 add 3
(D) More than $1,000,000 add 4
(E) More than $2,000,000 add 5
(F) More than $6,000,000 add 6
(G) More than $10,000,000 'add 7
(H) More than $35,000,000 add 8
Commentary
Application Note:
1. If there is more than one underlying offense, choose the offense
that produces the highest offense level.
2. Counts subject to this guideline are to be grouped with counts of
the underlying offense according to § 3D 1.2(c).
3. Thevalue ofthe funds laundered, forpurposes of subsection (b)(3)
is not the value of the funds involved in the underlying offense
unless those funds are actually laundered within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. 1956.2
228. Compare proposed guideline with USSG § 2S1.1 (1999) (setting forth money
laundering guideline). Section 2S1.1 states the following:
§ 2S1.1. Laundering ofMonetary Instruments:
(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) 23, if convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2XA), or
(aX3)(A);
(2) 20, otherwise.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the defendant knew or believed that the funds were the pro-
ceeds of an unlawful activity involving the manufacture, im-
portation, or distribution of narcotics or other controlled sub-
stances, increase by 3 levels.
(2) If the value of the funds exceeded $100,000, increase the offense level
as follows:
(A) Value (Apply the Greatest) Increase in Level
(3) More than $100,000 add 1
(C) More than $200,000 add 2
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The operation of the proposed guideline is simple. The base offense
level of the money laundering count is the total offense level of the underlying
fraud count.229 Subsection (a)(2) provides a falback base offense level for
cases in which court cannot calculate the underlying offense level.3 The
amount of funds that comprise the money laundering activity increases the
offense level according to the table in subsection (b)(3). 3 In cases in which
the defendant intends to further the underlying crime through money launder-
ing, subsection (b)(1) increases the offense level by 2 levels3 2 In cases in
which the defendant launders funds by sophisticated means, subsection (b)(2)
increases the offense level by 2 levels 33 Finally, Application Note 2 instructs
the court to group the money laundering count with the underlying count. 4
This Note's solution furthers the policies of the Sentencing Guidelines
by reducing the effect of the charging decision and by providing for incremen-
tal punishment, uniformity, and proportionality. 5 The proposed guideline's
(D) More than $350,000 add 3
(E) More than $600,000 add 4
(F) More than $1,000,000 add 5
(G) More than $2,000,000 add 6
(I) More than $3,500,000 add 7
(1) More than $6,000,000 add 8
(J) More than $10,000,000 add 9
(K) More than $20,000,000 add 10
(L) More that $35,000,000 add 11
(M) More than $60,000,000 add 12
(N) More than $100,000,000 add 13
Id.
229. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline).
230. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline).
231. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline).
232. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline).
233. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline).
234. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline).
235. See supra notes 171-95 (discussing policies of Sentencing Guidelines and of Con-
gress).
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variable base offense level reduces the effect of the charging decision."
Thus, unlike the present day guidelines, the proposed guideline would permit
a money laundering charge in addition to a relatively minor fraud conviction
to have only a relatively mild impact on the sentence. 7 Second, the proposed
guideline provides for incremental punishment by ensuring that the act of
money laundering always provides for a more severe sentence than the under-
lying act alone." This approach is in keeping with the clear intent of Con-
gress to severely punish money laundering. 9 Third, the proposed guideline
furthers the goal of uniformity by eliminating the present day circuit split.
240
Last, the proposal advances the goal of proportionality by imposing more
severe sentences as the seriousness of the money laundering conduct in-
creases.241 The proposal provides for a more severe sentence if the defendant
is convicted under §§ 1956(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), or (a)(3)(A) because these sec-
tions have an additional intent element. 42 The proposal also provides for a
236. A money laundering charge under the proposed guideline would have a small impact
in cases involving small scale fraud and increasing impact as the amount of funds laundered
increases. For instance, in a case where all $600,000 defrauded is laundered by ordinary means,
the effect would be a total offense level that is three levels more severe than if fraud alone were
charged. In contrast, a scheme that launders $2,500,000 by sophisticated means would be
subject to a 7 level increase over the fraud charge alone.
237. Because the base offense level for the money laundering count reflects the total offense
level of the underlying crime, a money laundering count in a fraud case involving $170,000,
would increase the total offense level by only two levels. But cf United States v. Smith, 186
F.3d 290,297 (3d Cir. 1999) (demonstrating that adding money laundering charge to fraud case
involving $169,500 would increase total offense level by twelve levels).
238. At a minimum, the proposed money laundering guideline adds one to the total offense
level. At a maximum, the proposed guideline adds twelve levels.
239. See USSG § 2S1.1, cmt. background (1999) ("In keeping with the clear intent of the
legislation, this guideline provides for substantial punishment").
240. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline). Application note two of the proposed guideline states "[c]ounts subject to
this guideline are to be grouped with counts of the underlying offense according to § 3D1.2(b)."
Id.
241. See USSO ch. 1, pt A, introductory cmt. (1999) (stating that guidelines further goal
of proportionality through "a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal
conduct of differing severity").
242. See id. § 2S1.1, cmt background ("A higher base offense level is specified if the
defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(aXIXA), (aX2)(A), or (a)(3XA) because those
subsections apply to defendants who encouraged or facilitated the commission of further
crimes."); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(aX1XA), (a)(2XA), (aX3)(A) (stating intent requirements for these
sections); see also United States v. Emerson, 128F.3d 557, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing
difference between promotion and concealment prongs of money laundering statute). For a
more detailed look at the promotion and concealment provisions of the 18 U.S.C. § 1956, see
generally Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering ControlAct of 1986: Creating a New Federal
Offense orMerely AffordingFederal Prosecutors an Alternative Means ofPunishingSpecified
UnlawfulActivity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823 (1995).
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higher offense level when a defendant uses sophisticated means to conceal the
source of the funds.243 Thus, the proposed guideline punishes money launder-
ing activity by effectively increasing the offense level of the underlying crime
in proportion to the seriousness ofthe money laundering conduct.
Because Congress disapproved the Sentencing Commission's amendment
to § 2S 1.1, it would be unwise to resubmit a substantially similar proposal.'"
Accordingly, this Note's proposal is sufficiently different than the Sentencing
Commission's amendmentto § 2S 1.1 .245 More important, this Note's proposal
is responsive to incremental punishment concerns voiced by the Judiciary
243. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline). Subsection (bX2) of the proposed guideline states "[i]f sophisticated means
are employed to conceal the source of the funds, increase by 2 levels." Id.
244. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. L. 104-38, (1995)
(disapproving Sentencing Commission's proposed money laundering guideline).
245. Compare proposed guideline, supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text, with
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074,
25,085-86 (1995) (proposed May 10, 1995) (setting forth Sentencing Commission's proposed
amendment to § 2S1.1). The Commission's proposal reads as follows:
§2S1.1 Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging in Monetary Transactions
in Property Derived from Unlawful Activity
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest):
(1) The offense level for the underlying offense from which the funds were derived,
if the defendant committed the underlying offense (or otherwise would be account-
able for the commission of the underlying offense under 1.3 (Relevant Conduct))
and the offense level for that offense can be determined; or
(2) [12] plus the number of offense levels from the table in §2F1.1 (Fraud and
Deceit) corresponding to the value of the funds, if the defendant knew or believed
that the funds were the proceeds of an offense involving the manufacture, importa-
tion, or distribution of controlled substances [or listed chemicals; a crime of
violence; or an offense involving firearms or explosives, national security, or inter-
national terrorism]; or
(3) [8] plus the number of offense levels from the table in §2Fl.1 (Fraud and Deceit)
corresponding to the value of the funds.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the defendant knew or believed that (A) the financial or monetary transac-
tions, transfers transportation, or transmissions were designed in whole or in part
to conceal or disguise the proceeds of criminal conduct, or (B) the funds were to be
used to promote further criminal conduct, increase by 2 levels.
(2) If subsection (bX1XA) is applicable and the offense (A) involved placement of
funds into, or movement of funds through or from, a company or financial institu-
tion outside the United States, or (B) otherwise involved a sophisticated form of
money laundering, increase by 2 levels.
Application Notes
2. Ifthe defendant is to be sentenced both on a count for an offense from which the
funds were derived and on a count under this guideline, the counts will be grouped
together under subsection (c) of §3D1 .2 (Groups of Closely- Related Counts).
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Committee when it disapproved the Sentencing Commission's proposed guide-
line in 1995.246 The proposal responds to Congress's concern by always pro-
viding for punishment under the money laundering guideline that is more
severe than the punishment that the underlying offense's guideline alone pro-
vides.247 Therefore, the money laundering count always increases the offense
level ofthe fraud and money laundering Group.248 By contrast, the Sentencing
Commission's proposed amendment to § 2S 1.1 gives an offense level equal to
the underlying offense unless a specific offense characteristic in subsection (b)
is applicable. 49
B. Applying the Proposed Solution
Another look at this Note's hypothetical explains the operation of the
proposed guideline and contrasts its operation with the current guidelinesY °
Additionally, the operation of the proposed guideline reinforces the under-
lying policy choice that informed the drafting of the proposal.sI Recall that
federal district courts in different jurisdictions convicted Smith and Brown for
246. See HR. REP. No. 104-272, at 4 (1995) (stating reasons for recommending disap-
proval of Sentencing Commission's proposed changes to money laundering guideline).
247. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline). Subsection (b)(3) of the proposed guideline always provides for additional
punishment based on the amount of funds that a defendant launders. Id.
248. See USSG § 3D1.3(a) (1999) (stating that offense level for § 3D1.2(a)-(c) Group is
offense level of count with highest offense level). Under the proposed guideline, because the
money laundering count's offense level is always higher than the offense level of the underlying
offense, the offense level of the Group is always higher than the offense level of the fraud count.
See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laundering guide-
line).
249. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg.
25,074,25,085 (proposed May 10, 1995) (providing Commission's proposed money laundering
guideline). The proposed guideline states the following:
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the defendant knew or believed that (A) the financial or monetary trans-
actions, transfers transportation, or transmissions were designed in whole
or in part to conceal or disguise the proceeds of criminal conduct, or (B)
the funds were to be used to promote criminal conduct, increase by 2
levels.
(2) If subsection (bXIXA) is applicable and the offense (A) involved place-
ment of funds into, or movement of funds through or from, a company or
financial institution outside the United States, or (B) otherwise involved a
sophisticated form of money laundering, increase by 2 levels.
Id.
250. See supra notes 1-30 and accompanying text (describing this Note's hypothetical).
251. See supra notes 236-49 and accompanying text (stating policies furthered by proposed
money laundering guideline).
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their respective fraudulent schemes under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.252 The courts
also convicted the hypothetical defendants of money laundering under 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B). 253 At sentencing, both courts calculated the amount
of money fraudulently obtained and the amount of money laundered as
$500,000.
Under the proposed guideline, courts determining the offense level for the
mail fraud count under USSG § 2Fl.1 proceed as under the current guide-
line. 4 The base offense level is 6.5' The specific offense characteristic of
$500,000 increases the offense level by 10 levels." 6 Because each defendant's
scheme involved multiple victims and mass marketing, USSG § 2Fl.l(b)(2)-
(3) increases the offense level by 4 levels.2"7 The resulting final offense level
for the mail fraud count is 20.
The calculations for the money laundering count are completely different
under the proposed guideline." The base offense level is that of the underly-
ing fraud count, 20.1 Subsection (b)(3) of the proposed guideline adds 2
levels.2"c No other enhancements apply. Thus, the total offense level for the
money laundering count is 22.26
The court then groups the fraud count with the money laundering count
under § 3D1.2(b).262 According to § 3D1.3(a), the offense level for the Group
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1999).
253. Id. § 1956(aXl)(B).
254. USSO § 2Fl.1 (1999) (statingthat § 2F1.1 applies to counts of fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341).
255. See id. § 2Fl.l(a) (setting base offense level at 6).
256. See id. § 2FI.I(bXl) (listing increases in offense level corresponding to specific
offense characteristic of amount of monetary loss).
257. See id. § 2Fl.1(bX2)-(3) (providing two-level increase for scheme to defraud more
than one victim and two-level increase for use of mass-marketing).
258. Compare id. § 2S1.1 (providing money laundering guideline), with supra notes 227-
28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laundering guideline).
259. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laun-
dering guideline). Subsection (a)(1) of the proposed guideline states that the base offense level
for the money laundering count is the total offense level of the underlying act Id.
260. See id. (setting forth proposed money laundering guideline). Subsection (b)(3) of the
proposed guideline provides a 2-level increase for $500,000 of laundered funds. Id. Note that
one penny more results in a 3-level increase. Id.
261. Recall that under the present day money laundering guideline, the total offense level
for the money laundering count was 23. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (showing
calculation of offense level for money laundering count under current § 2S1.1).
262. See USSO § 3D1.2 (1999) (providing for grouping of counts "[w]hen one of the
counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjust-
ment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts"); see also supra notes 227-28 and
accompanying text (setting forth proposed money laundering guideline). Application note 2 of
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is the offense level of the most serious count.263 Therefore, the offense level
for the Group is 22.2" The corresponding sentence for a criminal history
category of I is forty-one to fifty-one months.
2 65
Compare this sentence with the sentences present day courts in the non-
grouping and grouping circuits would have given.2 Courts inthe nongrouping
circuits would have given a sentence of fifty-seven to seventy-one months
based on an offense level of 25.267 Courts in the grouping circuits would have
given a sentence of forty-six to fifty-seven months based on an offense level
of 23." The proposed guideline eliminates the sentencing disparity and
provides an offense level that reflects the seriousness of the underlying crimi-
nal conduct.
The hypothetical sentencing under the proposed guideline reveals and
reinforces the policy choices that shaped this Note's solution.269 First, it is
apparent that the proposed guideline reduces the impact of the decision to
charge money laundering." By reducing the impact ofthe charging decision,
the proposed guideline remedies a pervasive problem that the grouping split
exacerbates - the lack of proportionality and uniformity that arises from
inconsistent charging decisions with respect to money laundering charges."
Second, the proposed guideline provides for incremental punishment by
providing a total combined offense level that is greater than that of the under-
lying fraud count.27 2 Finally, the hypothetical illustrates that the proposed
the proposed guideline states that money laundering counts are to be grouped with underlying
count according to § 3D1.2(b). Id.
263. See USSG § 3D1.3(a) (1999) (stating that offense level for Group is offense level of
count in Group with highest offense level).
264. See id. (stating that offense level for Group is offense level of count in Group with
highest offense level).
265. See id. § 5A (providing sentencing table).
266. See supra notes 1-30 and accompanying text (stating sentences for hypothetical defen-
dants).
267. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text (stating sentence for defendant Smith).
268. See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text (illustrating operation of proposed
guideline by working through hypothetical sentencing).
269. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (stating sentence for defendant Brown).
270. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text (illustrating that proposed guideline
results in lesser sentence than under current guideline).
271. See SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 8 (stating that lack of
uniformity and proportionality is "problem that is neither hypothetical nor isolated in occur-
rence. In fact, the Commission's analysis of money laundering sentences reflects that disparate
sentencing persists [when money laundering is charged in addition to fraud] as a result of the
structure of the current money laundering guidelines.").
272. See USSO ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt (1999) ("The rules in this Part seek to
provide incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct").
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guideline is easy to apply because it eliminates the grouping decision.273
VP. Conclusion
Congress can and should resolve the circuit split that has arisen over the
grouping of fraud and money laundering charges. 4 To arrive at this conclu-
sion, this Note first demonstrated that the circuit conflict is resulting in dispa-
rate sentences for defendants who have committed identical crimes. 5 Second,
this Note explored the reasoning of both the nongrouping circuits and the
grouping circuits.276 Third, this Note discussed the impact of the decision to
charge money laundering in addition to a fraud count." Fourth, this Note
discussed the policies ofthe grouping and nongrouping circuits, ofthe Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and of Congress when it rejected the Sentencing Commission's
proposal to rewrite the money laundering guideline." 8 Finally, this Note
demonstratedthat a simple and workable solution is possible.279 Consequently,
this Note urges that the Sentencing Commission and Congress take immediate
action to resolve the circuit conflict that has arisen over the grouping of fraud
and money laundering counts by substantially rewriting the money laundering
guideline.
When Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines, it intended to limit
the discretion of the trial court and to reduce the confusion inherent in the old
system. ° Although many sections of the current Sentencing Guidelines
arguably have had a good deal of success in achieving Congress's goals, the
grouping of fraud and money laundering charges is an example of where the
Sentencing Guidelines have fallen well short of Congress's goals. Unless
Congress passes an amendment that provides guidance on the fraud and
273. See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text (illustrating operation of proposed
guideline by working through hypothetical sentencing).
274. See supra Part I (describing sentencing disparity that results from circuit split); supra
part V (outlining solution to grouping split).
275. See supra Part I (demonstrating sentencing disparity between grouping and nongroup-
ing circuits).
276. See supra Part H (exploring reasoning of nongrouping and grouping circuits).
277. See supra Part II (discussing impact of decision to charge money laundering).
278. See supra Part IV (discussing policies of nongrouping and grouping circuits, of Con-
gress, and of Sentencing Guidelines).
279. See supra Part V (providing proposal that solves fraud and money laundering issue
and showing operation of this proposal).
280. See USSO ch. 1, pt A, introductory cmt. (1999) ("It [Congress] sought to avoid the
confusion and implicit deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system which
required the court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and empowered the
parole commission to determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would serve in
prison.").
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money laundering issue, defendants will continue to face sentences that are
uncetain2 " and, perhaps, out of proportion to their criminal acts.'
281. See supra Part I (illustrating sentencing disparity between grouping and nongrouping
circuits).
282. See SENTENCIG COMMISSIONREPORT, supra note 128, at7 (providing Commission's
analysis of use of money laundering statute). The report states the following:
The Commission's long-term analysis of money laundering cases also demonstrated
that the intended relationship between the harm caused and the measurement of the
offense seriousness under the money laundering sentencing guidelines has become
distorted. Individuals who engaged in essentially the same offense conduct re-
ceived substantially higher or lower sentences, depending on whether they were
charged, convicted, and sentenced under the underlying offense-related statute, or
the money laundering statute, or both.
Id. (footnote omitted).
